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discusses the e¤ectiveness of short-run lending in their prevention. It develops an overlapping
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nd that the strategy to overcome liquidity problems could worsen
bankspositions and cause bank runs and sudden stops. A small liquidity shock may still lead to a
banking crisis through the depositorsexpectation. A large shock would require short-run lending to
prevent an immediate bank run, but the repayment obligation may worsen moral hazard problems.
JEL Classication: E32, E44, F21, F32, F34.
Keywords: capital ows, banking crises, sudden stops, moral hazard, and short-run lending.
Acknowledgment: I specially thank the comments and suggestion received from Leonardo Baccini,
Nicolas Groshenny, Erasmus Kersting, Victor Li, Anella Munro, Dennis Rose, Christie Smith, John
Singleton, and the participants at the 5th annual conference on The Political Economy of Interna-
tional Organizations, the 2nd annual workshop on New Zealand Macroeconomic Dynamics, and the
seminar at Reserve Bank of New Zealand. All errors are my own.
Correspondence: Dr. Chia-Ying Chang, School of Economics and Finance, Victoria University of
Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand. Phone: (+64)4-463-6146. Fax: (+64)4-463-5146. E-mail:
chia-ying.chang@vuw.ac.nz.
1 Introduction
Sudden stops, or a sudden slowdown of private capital inows, have been considered to be one of
the main reasons of current account reversal. Edwards (2004) documents the empirical relation-
ship between sudden stops and current account reversals, and notes that even without restrictions
on capital mobility may not be possible to lower the probability of such a reversal. Moreover,
Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody (2008) nd that a large share (around 50%) of sudden stops coincide
with banking crises, rather than currency crises, and that the impacts of sudden stops on portfolio
capital ows is about 2% of GDP1. They, however, nd that these sudden stops have no discemible
impact on net foreign direct investment. Their ndings highlight the important impact of banking
crises on private capital ows, especially on short-run portfolio capital ows, and point out that
such linkages provide key insights to enhance our understanding of the occurrence of sudden stops.
Although there have been many studies on capital ows and sudden stops, most are empirical in
nature and limited in their ability to uncover the transmission mechanism between banking crises
and sudden stops. To be more specic, it is still a puzzle whether the causality between banking
crises and sudden stops is unidirectional. Furthermore, since it is generally understood that the
failure to meet demand deposits is one of the main reasons for bank runs [Diamond and Dybvig
(1983)], international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), provide
their member countries with a short-run lending (SRL) facility as a crucial resource to stop/prevent
sudden stops. Although SRL is designed to remedy the liquidity problems of nancial institutions
and may prevent banking crises under some circumstances, the nancial crisis which started in 2007
has shown us once again that another important cause of banking crises is the moral hazard problem
facing lenders, an issue that has often been neglected by the literature on sudden stops.
The contribution of this paper is to provide a mechanism linking banking crises and sudden stops
in the presence of moral hazard and to analyze the e¤ectiveness of SRL facilities in overcoming these
crises. The paper extends a three-period-lived overlapping generations model to an open economy
with international credit markets that involve transactions in debt and equity between countries.
1This is based on the three main measures of capital accounts, which are foreign direct investment, portfolio
investments, and other investment.
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The credit market imperfections introduced to the model are similar to those in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). There are no capital controls imposed by either country. The nancial intermediaries
serve as middlemen in the credit markets and as portfolio managers for their depositors. These
intermediaries can trigger a banking crisis by either failing to meet demand deposits or the moral
hazard problem.
Consequently, there are three main ndings of this paper. First, should there be liquidity
shortage, a solution which nances the shortfall of demand deposits with an injection of additional
funds (new deposits) could worsen the situation. To be more specic, the nancial intermediaries
may respond to the need for additional reserves by o¤ering even more competitive deposit rates to
attract new depositors, and thus excerbate the impact of future bank runs in the following period.
Second, an adverse shock may or may not trigger bank runs and sudden stops, depending on the
size of the shock and the impact on depositorsexpectations. Even a small productivity shock,
which does not a¤ect the nancial intermediariesability to meet demand deposits, might lead to
a self-fullling expectation if the shock increases the likelihood of a bank run. Therefore, the
availability of SRL facility could serve as insurance to prevent bank runs and sudden stops in this
case. Third, a large shock, which a¤ects banksability to meet demand deposits, would require
SRL to prevent immediate bank runs and sudden stops. However, the obligation to repay could
aggravate the moral hazard issue, especially when nancial intermediaries are unable to accumulate
su¢ cient prots to repay. To prevent this worst scenario for both the depositors and the institutions
which provide the SRL facilities, these short-term loan contracts must be incentive compatible and
ensure a reasonable length of time for nancial intermediaries to repay.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Discussions
on banking crises, sudden stops and SRL facilities follow in Section 3. Conclusions and possible
extensions are stated in Section 4.
2 THE MODEL
This paper extends Bencivenga and Smiths (1991) work to an open-economy overlapping genera-
tions model and incorporates capital market imperfections, which are similar to those in Kiyotaki
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and Moore (1997, 2002) and Boyd and Smith (1999), to examine how banking crises and sudden
stops are linked together. Additional to the main ndings of the benchmark model, the e¤ectiveness
of short-run lending facilities to prevent banking crises and sudden stops is considered.
The benchmark model considers an economy with two countries, home and foreign. The pop-
ulation growth rate (n) is the same for both countries, Nt = nNt 1 and N = nNt 1, where N
and N represent the population of the home and the foreign country, respectively. The econ-
omy of each country is composed of households, rms, and nancial intermediaries (banks), which
serve as middlemen in the credit markets, including both loan and equity markets, and act as a
portfolio manager for their depositors. Banking literature suggested that individuals are better o¤
in an economy with nancial intermediaries, which save monitoring costs and share risks to some
degree2, compared to an economy without nancial intermediaries. In fact, the average rate of
return earned and o¤ered by nancial intermediaries is often higher than the rate of return earned
by self-investing. Therefore, in an economy with nancial intermediaries, individuals would rather
deposit their income in the nancial intermediaries than self-invest. To reect this fact, and to
simplify the model, it is assumed that all individuals deposit their income in the nancial interme-
diaries, rather than self-investing. Unlike in the traditional setup, the nancial intermediaries act
as rms maximizing prots. The possibility of moral hazard problems will be discussed in the later
section.
2.1 Households
Each household lives for three periods: young, middle-aged and old. Everyone is born identical
with one unit of labor as endowment when young, but nothing when middle-aged and when old, and
values only consumption in middle-age (c2;t+1) and old (c3;t+2) age. Therefore, each young would
devote its labour endowment to earning wages and deposit all income into nancial intermediaries,
which o¤er both short-run and long-run accounts for all individuals. The household would decide
how to allocate income between di¤erent types of accounts before turning middle-aged. There are
short-run (SR thereafter) accounts, which take one period to mature, and long-run (LR thereafter)
2Therefore, the economy with nancial intermediaires is more e¢ cient and more productive then the economy
without nancial intermediaries [Champ, Freeman and Haslag (2011), Bencivenga and Smith (1991)].
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accounts, which take two periods to mature. Among SR accounts, there are two types: saving
accounts and investment (so called money market) accounts. More details will be provided later.
After turning middle-aged, each indivisual learns its type. There are two types, an investor or
an entrepreneur. With an exogenous probability  (1  ), the individual turns into an investor
(entrepreneur) at middle-age. Each middle-aged household can be only one type, which is private
information to the individual only, and this remains unchanged thereafter. The distribution of
types, however, is public information. The investors and entrepreneurs are di¤erent in two aspects:
in skills and in their way of spending withdrawals from their short-term accounts. More specically,
the entrepreneurs own the skills of obtaining funds to nance projects, and of operating rms to
start production. Accordingly, the entrepreneurs would spend withdrawals on operating rms,
while the investors would spend their withdrawals on reinvestment. The utility function is in the
form of:
U(c2;t+1; c3;t+2) =  (c2;t+1 + 
ic3;t+2)
 

;where i = I; E (1)
where i represents the degree of patience of the individual, depending on its own type, and 0 <
I < E < 1 indicates that investors (I) are assumed less patient than entrepreneurs (E). After
learning about its own type, the middle-aged household would visit the nancial intermediaries
to withdraw from their matured SR accounts and spend in thier chosen way. When old, the
entrepreneurs receive net prots, and the investors receive returns from their reinvestments which
they used for consumption.
The rates of return from di¤erent accounts at maturing are di¤erent. Consider an account
opening at period t. A saving account o¤ers the net interest rate
 
iDt

at period t+1; an investment
account o¤ers the net return rate
 
iEt+1

at period t + 1; a LR account, as shown in Figures ve
and six, o¤ers the net interest rate
 
iLRDt

at period t+ 2, or the net interest rate (iELt ) at period
t+1 will be provided if the account is liquidated prematurely, iELt <
 
iEt+1; i
D
t

< iLRDt . Since both
the saving account and LR account are demand deposits, the interest rates iDt ; i
LRD
t ; and i
EL
t are
pre-determined by the nancial intermediaries at the time of deposit. The net interest rate (iEt+1),
however, is a oating rate, which is determined by the equity market clearing condition.
At date t, each young allocates its income among all types of account, as shown in Figure one.
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The allocation is as follows: a fraction St (< 1) is placed in the SR account and a fraction
 
1  St

is placed in long term account. Among the funds in SR accounts, a fraction It (< 1) is placed in
the investment accounts and the rest
 
1  It

is placed in the saving accounts. At date t+1, each
young becomes middel-ages, and withdraws their SR accounts, receiveing WMt+1:
WMt+1 
 
1 + iDt

St
 
1  It

wt +
 
1 + iEt+1

St 
I
twt (2)
2.1.1 Investors
After receiving WMt at period t, the middle-aged of generation t   1 would behave according to
their own types, as shown in Figure two. For the investor, the problem is to maximize utility
(cI2;t + 
IcI3;t+1) by choosing whether to reinvest (RI), which country to reinvest in, and whether
to liquidate the LR accounts prematurely (EL). It is assumed that the investors would focus on
one country to reinvest in, and that if the average rate of return is the same in both countries, the
investor would re-invest in the domestic country, about which more is known. An investor who
decides to invest in domestic (foreign) country, would place IMt
 
IMt

fraction of his/her total
re-investment in investment accounts, and the rest, the fraction
 
1  IMt
  
1  IMt

in saving
accounts.
After consumption cI2;t, an investors decisions on reinvestment and early liquidation would
provide the following returns for old-age consumption:
Table 1: The payo¤ for an investor
options newly created wealth at each date after consumption cI2;t
RI EL W IMt+1
1 yes no RIMt
 
WMt   cI2;t

+
 
1 + iLRDt 1
  
1  St 1

wt 1
2 no no
 
WMt   cI2;t

+
 
1 + iLRDt 1
  
1  St 1

wt 1
3 no yes
 
WMt   cI2;t

+
 
1 + iELt 1
  
1  St 1

wt 1
4 yes yes RIMt
 
WMt   cI2;t

+
 
1 + iELt 1
  
1  St 1

wt 1

;
where RIMt 
 
1 + iDt
  
1  IMt

+
 
1 + iEt+1

IMt

. Note that all households always have a stor-
age option, which provides a gross rate of return 1, if not re-investing via nancial intermediaries.
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The old consume cI3;t+1 = W
IM
t+1 . Based on the above table, given c
I
2;t, an investor prefers re-
investment (RI) if RIMt 
I > 1, and prefers not to liquidate LR account prematurely (non-EL) if
there is no uncertainty to receive iLRDt 1 at period t+ 1.
2.2 Firms and Debt Contracts
The entrepreneurs, who own special skills, are the ones capable of operating rms. Take a middle-
aged entrepreneur of generation t  1 as an example. After learning its own type and withdrawing
from SR accounts at period t, this entrepreneur must transform part of its WMt into capital goods
to start production. The transformation from output goods to capital goods (K) is assumed to be
one-to-one. Production requires both capital goods (Kt) and labour (Lt) as inputs, and takes one
period to complete. The production is in the Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns to scale:
Yt+1 = AtK

t L
1 
t , 0 <  < 1, where At represents production technology, and Yt+1 represents total
output goods produced at period t+ 1.
Additional to inputs, it takes sunk costs qt to operate a rm, and all labour wages have to be
paid by the end of period t + 1. That is before the completion of the production at period t + 2.
Therefore, the entrepreneur must spend a minimum qt+1+wt+1Lt+1+Kt+1 to start the production.
Since qt + wtLt +Kt > WMt , any entrepreneur who plans to operate a rm must borrow to start
production. There are two resources available for entrepreneurs to obtain funds. One resource is
to le an application to nancial intermediaries to get a loan (the debt market). The other is to
issue equities in the equity market. It is assumed that entrepreneurs raise funds in the domestic
credit markets only. This is because the cost of acquiring information about foreign entrepreneurs
before providing funds could be very high, so that the entrepreneurs usually have more di¢ culties
raising funds in the foreign country. The one-period production in this model implies that only
short-term funds are acquired, not long term funds.
2.2.1 Debt Finance
To acquire a loan from the nancial intermediaries, an entrepreneur needs to provide collateral
(Bt), which will not be returned until the loan is repaid. The amount of loan demanded by an
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entrepreneur is:
bDt = qt + wtLt  
 
WMt   cE2;t  Kt  Bt

; (3)
where cE2;t represents the entrepreneurs middle-aged consumption before production. In the debt
market, the source of loanable funds is limited to the sum of depositorssaving accounts at period
t, so there exists credit rationing in the debt market. That means that only a fraction
 
D

of
entrepreneurs can obtain loans from the nancial intermediaries. Let St denote the total deposits
in the saving accounts at period t. As shown in Figure three, the resource constraint is
St  Dt (1  )NtbDt ; (4)
which can be rewritten as Dt  St=

(1  )NtbDt

. This shows that the more costly it is to start
production, the more severe the credit rationing will be. Entrepreneurs who obtain loans from the
nancial intermediaries are called debt-nance entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs who fail to get
loans, and must raise funds in the equity market are called equity-nance entrepreneurs.
The loan rate
 
iloant

is pre-determined by banks at the time when the debt contract is o¤ered.
An acceptable debt contract requires
 
1 + iloant

bDt < Yt+1. Additionally, the debt contract must
take into account the uncertain success rate of production. The uncertainty of production is
as follows: production might succeed with an exogenous probability p and generate net prot
Yt+1  
 
1 + iLoant

bt. Failed production, with probability (1  p) would produce zero output and
leave the loan unpaid. The true state of production is observable without cost by the entrepreneur
who owns the rm only, but is costly to all other agents. To reduce verication costs and have the
true state of production reported, the nancial intermediaries must verify the production state when
the loan is unpaid. If verication takes place, whether revealing success or failure, the nancial
intermediaries will take everything away. As a result, all entrepreneurs always report the true state.
Therefore, following Bernanke et al (1996), the expected payo¤ of a debt-nance entrepreneur is
Et
DF
t+1 = p

Yt+1  
 
1 + iLoant

bDt +Bt

: (5)
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2.2.2 Equity Finance
For the equity-nance entrepreneurs, the available funds are the aggregate investment accounts at
period t (It). The resource constraint for equity market is:
It  bEt (1  )ENt; (6)
where bEt = qt + wtLt  
 
WMt  Kt

, and D + E  1. This constraint shows that the amount
of entrepreneurs getting equity nance is limited to It. Note that since bEt < b
D
t , in the case of
It = St, E > D. The entrepreneurs who do not get either debt or equity nance would turn to
investors. The expected payo¤ of an equity-nance entrepreneur is:
Et
EF
t+1 = p

Yt+1  
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

bEt

; (7)
where iEt+1 is the net rate of return to the equity holders, and it is determined by the equity market
at the period t + 1, after the production is completed. So the problem faced by a debt-nance
entrepreneur is to choose Lt and Kt to maximize equation (5) subject to equation (3). The problem
faced by an equity-nance entrepreneur is similar to that of a debt-nance entrepreneur, except for
collateral (Bt = 0) and for the rate of return
 
iEt+1

.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Capital Gains
The full employment assumption gives the labour market clearing condition, Lt = 1= (1  )
 
Dt + 
E
t

.
This gives optimal the capital input, labour demand, and wage rate:
KDFt =
1
(1  )  D + E

At
1 + iloant
1=(1 )
, KEFt =
1
(1  )  D + E
 
At
1 + EtiEt+1
!1=(1 )
;
(8a)
LDFt = L
EF
t =
1
(1  )  D + E (8b)
wDFt = 
=(1 )(1  )

At
1 + iloant
1=(1 )
; wEFt = 
=(1 )(1  )
 
At
1 + EtiEt+1
!1=(1 )
: (8c)
At the time of making decisions on the amount of capital to invest and labour to hire, the entre-
preneurs have not yet learned the value of iEt+1. The equity nanced entrepreneurs hence would
form expectation EtiEt+1 = i
loan
t . Accordingly, the entrepreneurs would invest K
DF
t = K
EF
t , and
8
LDFt = L
EF
t . The full employment assumption gives w
DF
t = w
EF
t , so there will be no wage
discrimination and no labour mobility across rms. This gives entrepreneurs capital gains of :
Et 
DF
t+1 = p

Yt+1  
 
1 + iLoant

bDt +Bt

, and Et DFt+1 = p

Yt+1  
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

bEt

, and entrepre-
neurs would borrow to operate rms if
cE2;t+
EEt 
DF
t+1  cI2;t+E
n
Max
 
W IMt+1

ij
o
; cE2;t+
EEt 
EF
t+1  cI2;t+E
n
Max
 
W IMt+1

ij
o
; (9)
,where
 
W IMt+1

ij
; (i = (RI;Non RI), j = (EL; non   EL)), represents all possible returns an
investor could obtain when old. This indicates that the entrepreneurs would start production only
if the expected capital gains are higher than the maximum expected returns of an investor. In
other words, if the expected capital gains were less than the returns of an investor, the entrepreneurs
would prefer to become investors, rather than start production.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
As a middleman for both the debt and the equity markets, the nancial intermediaries provide
depositors various accounts, which serve di¤erent purposes. Saving accounts are for the debt
market, investment accounts are for the equity market, and long-term accounts are for arbitrary
long-term safe assets which do not default. In this model, both saving accounts and long term
accounts are demand deposits, which are tied with deposit contracts with pre-determined interest
rates. Failing to repay these two types of accounts would result in bank runs. The role of
nancial intermediaries in the debt market and in the equity market are di¤erent. In the debt
market, nancial intermediaries o¤er loan contracts to the entrepreneurs, and o¤er saving accounts
to depositors. In the equity market, nancial intermediaries serve as a channel to provide the
funds in investment accounts to equity-nance entrepreneurs. They also provide returns to the
investment account holders on oating interest rates, which are determined by the equity market.
Demand deposits require the nancial intermediaries to manage the saving and long term ac-
counts with caution while choosing the interest rates to attract depositors and to maximize their
prots. Let t (1  t ) denote the fraction of domestic (foreign) investors who choose domestic
nancial intermediaries to reinvest, and let Bt (
H
t ) be the fraction of the long term accounts in
which the nancial intermediaries (households) decide to liquidate prematurely, respectively. The
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problem faced by the domestic nancial intermediaries at date t is to choose iDt , i
LRD
t , i
loan
t ,and 
B
t
to maximize the expected payo¤ EtBt+1:
Et
B
t+1 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

St+1   Dt+1 (1  )NbDt+1

+

(1  )Dt N

p
 
1 + iloant

bDt + (1  p)Bt
   1 + iDt St
+
 
Bt+1   Ht+1
  
1  St
  
1 + iELt

wtN
+
 
1  St 1
  
1  Bt
  
1 + iLRt 1
   1  Ht   1 + iLRDt 1 wt 1N
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
; (10)
where St  St
 
1  It

wtN +

+
 
1  D   E t  1  IMt N  WMt   c2;t
+(1=et)
 (1  t )

1  IMt;FD

N
 
WMt   c2;t

is the aggregate saving accounts in the nan-
cial intermediaries at date t. The rst bracket of equation (10) is the saving accounts of the young
and the domestic and the foreign investors, who are the loan suppliers to the middle-aged entrepre-
neurs. The second line shows that the expected returns from loan repayments are used to meet the
withdrawals of matured saving accounts. The third line shows early liquidated long term accounts,
while the fourth line is the matured long term accounts at date t + 1. The details of the capital
ows are shown in Figures three, four, ve and six.
It is assumed that the nancial intermediaries manage all accounts exactly for the purpose
stated3. That is, the newly opened saving accounts provide the new loans and the matured loans
repay the matured saving accounts. All newly opened LR accounts will be placed in LR asset
investment, and the returns on, or early liquidation of, LR accounts will be used to repay the
matured LR accounts or to respond to the early liquidation requests. The nancial intermediaries
do not re-distribute funds between debt, equity and LR assets. Moreover, all SR assets, both debt
and equity, share the same degree of risk, and LR assetsreturns are perfectly secured. Therefore,
there is no problem with regard to investing in riskier assets by the nancial intermediaries. This is
similar to the concept of capital requirements for nancial intermediaries. The liquidity constraints
of the nancial intermediaries for matured SR [Figure four] and LR accounts, respectively, are:
h
p

1 + iloant

bDt + (1  p)Bt
i
(1  )Dt N 
 
1 + iDt

St; : (11a)
3The possibility of using new deposits or LR accounts to nance the shortage in repaying the demand deposits will
be discussed in the next section.
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 
Bt+1   Ht+1
  
1  St
  
1 + iELt

wtN (11b)
+
 
1  St 1
  
1  Bt
  
1 + iLRt 1
   1  Ht   1 + iLRDt 1 wt 1N  0:
In other words, the nancial intermediaries su¤er liquidity problems when failing to meet these two
constraints [equations (11a) and (11b)].
In order to attract both domestic and foreign investors, the domestic nancial intermediaries
have the incentive to o¤er a competitive deposit rate, iDt , which must satisfy the following two
constraints:
 
1 + iDt
  
1  IMt;DD

+
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

IMt;DD (12a)
 (1=et)
 
1 + iDt
  
1  IMt;DF

+
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

IMt;DF

 
1 + iDt
  
1  IMt;FD

+
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

IMt;FD (12b)
 (et)
 
1 + iDt
  
1  IMt;FF

+
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

IMt;FF

;
where t (t ) represents the real value of the domestic (foreign) currency; et  t=t represents
the real exchange rate at period t. The value of IMt;ij shows the fraction of reinvestment placed in
investment accounts in country j by a country i investor. This is to reect the possibilities that
the portfolio decisions of a foreign investor may di¤er from that of domestic investors, and that the
portfolio decisions made by domestic investors may di¤er in di¤erent countries, based on various
return rates in the debt and the equity markets of di¤erent countries.
2.4 Equilibrium Rates
By re-arranging equation (11a) and combining with equation (9), one can obtain the range of
equilibrium iloant :
1
p
"  
1 + iDt

St
(1  )Dt N
  (1  p)Bt
#
(13a)


1 + iloant

bDt  p
 
Yt+1 +Bt
  1
E
 
cI2;t   cE2;t
 max  W IMt+1ij ;
where the rst inequality shows the minimum iloant required to meet demand deposits, and the second
inequality shows the upper bound of iloant , which would have entrepreneurs willing to operate a rm.
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The equilibrium iDt can be obtained by using equations (11a), (12a), and (12b):
max
8><>:
(1=et)[(1+iDt )(1 IMt;DF )+(1+EtiEt+1)IMt;DF ] (1+EtiEt+1)IMt;DD
(1 IMt;DD)
;
(et)[(1+iDt )(1 IMt;FF )+(1+EtiEt+1)IMt;FF ] (1+EtiEt+1)IMt;FD
(1 IMt;FD)
9>=>; (13b)
  1 + iDt   p  1 + iloant  bDt + (1  p)Bt (1  )Dt NSt :
In the equity market, after supplying funds to equity nance rms at period t, the households
would receive iEt+1 at period t+1. The realized return rate in the equity market i
E
t+1 is determined
by the resource constraint of the equity market:
It
 
1 + iEt+1

= p
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

(1  )ENbEt = (1  )ENp tY EFt+1 (14)
where It  St ItwtN + 

+
 
1  D   EIMt N  WMt   c2;t
+(1=et)
 (1  t )IMt;FDN
 
WMt   c2;t

shows the aggregate amount in the investment ac-
counts, and  t represents the average fraction of output extracted to repay the equity holders by the
equity-nance entrepreneurs who experience successful production. Note that the actual equity rate
is equal to the expected return rate to the equity market,
 
1 + iEt+1

= p
 
1 + Eti
E
t+1

= p tY
EF
t+1 =b
E
t .
Rearranging equations (12a)-(12b), and (9) gives the range of equilibrium equity rate:
Max
8><>:
(1=et)[(1+iDt )(1 IMt;DF )+(1+EtiEt+1)IMt;DF ] (1+iDt )(1 IMt;DD)
IMt;DD
;
(et)[(1+iDt )(1 IMt;FF )+(1+EtiEt+1)IMt;FF ] (1+iDt )(1 IMt;FD)
IMt;FD
9>=>; (15)
  1 + iEt+1  1bEt

p Yt+1   1
E
 
cI2;t   cE2;t
 max  W IMt+1ij ;
where the rst inequality shows the minimum equity rate required to attract funds from investors,
and the second inequality shows the upper bound of equity rate to ensure entrepreneurs willing to
operate rms.
3 The Implications for Banking Crises and Sudden Stops
Bank runs occur when repayment of demand deposits cannot be made, that is when liquidity
constraints [equations (11a)-(11b)] are not satised. Equation (11a) is the liquidity constraint for
SR demand deposits, and equation (11b) is the liquidity constraint for LR demand deposits. Failing
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to satisfy one of the liquidity constraint may cause the nancial intermediaries to use other accounts
to nance the shortage. However, if the shortage is too large to be nanced by exhausting all other
accounts, the nancial intermediaries have no option but to bankrupt, due to insolvency.
In particular, the deposits, whether SR saving accounts or LR accounts, are on the liability side
of the balance sheets of the nancial intermediaries, while the repayment of loans and the returns
to the LR asset investment are on the asset side of the balance sheet. Insolvency occurs when the
total assets are less than total liabilities, leaving negative net worth in the nancial intermediaries.
In this section, I will demonstrate whether bank runs, followed by sudden stops, may depend
crucially on the size of the shock, and on the responses of householdsexpectations on bank runs
to the shocks. Moreover, since SRL facilities are often o¤ered to prevent/stop bank runs as well
as sudden stops, the role of SRL in preventing banking crises and sudden stops will be discussed in
this section.
3.1 Small shocks
The change in depositorsexpectatin in response to a shock could put banks in a position to run,
regardless of the size of any shock. Suppose a small adverse shock occurs to the domestic country,
but it is too small to cause an inability for banks to repay any type of demand deposit after receiving
loan repayments, and the returns to LR accounts. If depositors do not panic and withdraw early,
there will be no bank runs and sudden stops.
Unfortunately, if the depositors revise their expectation on the likelihood of bank runs in response
to the shock, then panic, and rush to the banks to liquidate their accounts before the loans are repaid
and before the returns to the accounts arrive, the nancial intermediaries will be forced to fully
liquidate all LR accounts prematurely Bt = 
H
t = 1, but still fail to repay all demand deposits
4.
As a result, insolvency would cause the banks to run and sudden stops would follow. This is
the type of bank run demonstrated in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). If such a small shock is an
international shock, bank runs and sudden stops would occur to the country in which depositors
panic and withdraw early before loans are repaid and the returns to the accounts arrive. In other
4The main reason is because the production may not yet be completed, and the only source to repay the panic
depositors is to liquidate prematurely the LR assets, which earns iELt < i
D
i .
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words, a country in which depositors have little faith in banks is easlily a¤ected by small shocks,
and more vulnerable to bank runs and sudden stops.
When the main cause of bank runs is the liquidity problem, or mismatching in the timing of
returns and repayments to the accounts, the role of SRL facilities serves as an insurance and becomes
crucial in alleviating liquidity problems. On the one hand, the amount of lending could be as large
as the sum of both SR and LR repayments to the depositors, because this amount is guaranteed
to be repaid if the loan repayment and the returns to LR accounts arrive. On the other hand,
the availability of su¢ cient SRL funding could lower the likelihood of depositors changing their
expectation on bank runs in response to a small shock, thus preventing bank runs, and sudden
stops. Therefore, in the case of su¢ ciently small shocks, the costs of providing SRL is low, and
such SR lending provision can be e¤ective in preventing bank runs and sudden stops.
3.2 Large shocks
In contrast, a large adverse shock is dened as a shock ("), which would prevent banks from repaying
demand deposits after receiving loan repayments and the returns of LR accounts, and may result
in bank runs, regardless of whether the depositors change their expectation. In this model, the
shock to the economy enters through the reduced success rate (p) of the projects undertaken by
entrepreneurs5. The occurrence of the shock lowers the projectssuccess rate to (p  "). If this
negative shock ("t) occurs at the beginning of period t, the banks would have liquidity problems
with the SR demand deposits,
(p  "t)
h
1 + iloant 1

bDt 1  Bt 1
i

" 
1 + iDt 1

St 1
(1  )DN  Bt 1
#
: (16)
Let t denote the amount of liquidity in relation of SR demand deposits, t 

(1+iDt 1)St 1
(1 )DN  Bt 1

 
(p  "t)
 
1 + iloant 1

bDt 1  Bt 1

. To prevent insolvency, the banks have several ways of responding
to the liquidity problem. One is to use new deposits, and the other is to use the LR accounts.
However, each has its own di¢ culties, and may or may not resolve the insolvency problem and
prevent bank runs and sudden stops.
5One may consider di¤erent ways in which the shocks enter the economy. This does not a¤ect the main conclusion
of this model.
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3.2.1 Using new deposit to nance the repayment of demand deposits
The shortage of liquidity to cover demand deposits raises the question of whether to use new deposits
St to nance the repayment of demand deposits. If not, then without access to lending facilities
from other sources, bank runs, followed by sudden stops, would be the result. If using new deposits
to nance the repayments of demand deposits, then taking the extreme case in which all St are used
to cover the shortfall in demand deposits repayments, the nancial intermediaries can not provide
loanable funds. Without loan repayments in the following period, the deposit rate
 
1 + iDt

which
the nancial intermediaries can provide, is 0 meaning iDt =  1, at which no depositors will be
willing to deposit. In other words, the value of iDt > 0 would cause bank runs in the next period,
and the value of iDt < 0 would result in no new deposits, St = 0.
In the case where a proportion (t) of St is used to cover the shortfall in liquidity, the nancial
intermediaries must set a low deposit rate
 
1 + iDt
  (1  t) p  1 + iloant + (1  p)Bt=bDt , push
up the loan rate, and widen the margin between the loan rate and the deposit rate, (iloant   iDt ).
If the adverse shock is exclusive to the domestic country, the su¢ ciently low domestic deposit rate
iDt (< i
D
t ) may promp the middle-aged investors to invest in the foreign country, if they receive
repayment of their SR accounts. The decrease in SR saving accounts lowers the available loanable
funds, and raises iloant even higher, thereby widening the interest rate di¤erential even further.
With such a high iloant , the prot earned by an entrepreneur shrinks. Once i
loan
t is pushed past the
upper bound, as indicated in equation (13a), no entrepreneurs would want to borrow from nancial
intermediaries. Without loan repayment from the rms, the nancial intermediaries cannot a¤ord
any iDt > 0. Unfortunately, if o¤ering a competitive deposit rate to compete with the foreign rate
and thus attract deposits, the nancial intermediaries cannot a¤ord the repayments of the demand
deposits in the next period. So the bank runs and sudden stops are postponed for one period.
Therefore, whether using all of part of new deposits to cover the shortage of liquidity, the
nancial intermediaries face trade o¤s in choosing iDt . If choosing an a¤ordable rate i
D
t , the
nancial intermediaries may receive few deposits, which would widen the interest rate di¤erential
and cause more severe credit rationing. As a result, the high iloant reduces entrepreneursprots, and
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in a more severe case may stop entrepreneurs from obtaining loans and operating rms. However,
if choosing a competitive rate similar to the foreign rate, the nancial intermediaries will prepare
for a run in the next period, since the repayments of demand deposits cannot be made.
3.2.2 Using LR accounts to nance SR demand deposit shortage
The LR accounts are also demand deposits, so the returns to the matured LR accounts must be
paid to LR accounts holders. Additional to new deposits, another source to nance the shortage
of SR demand deposit is to liquidate the LR accounts (Bt > 
H
t ), which are not yet matured at
period t and o¤er iELt < i
D
t . This means that nancial intermediaries are forced to liquidate more
than one unit, (1+ iDt )=
 
1 + iELt

> 1, in order to make up every unit short. Therefore, immediate
bank runs at period t would be the result if the liquidation of all LR accounts is insu¢ cient to cover
the liquidity problem of the SR demand deposits:
 
1  Bt
  
1  St 1
  
1 + iELt 1

wt 1N < t; (17)
where the left-hand-side represents the total amount the nancial intermediaries could receive if
liquidating prematurely all LR account, and the right-hand-side shows the amount of liquidity
shortage to be covered for SR demand deposits. Note that the returns to LR accounts do not
default. It is the return of early liquidation (iELt ) which has been stated in the deposit contract
insu¢ cient to cover the shortfalls that cause bank runs.
If bank runs at period t are not avoidable even after liquidating all LR accounts, all depositors
would want to rush to withdraw all their accounts, including by early liquidation Ht = 1; as soon
as witnessing the shock. The time to withdraw could be either before or after the loan repayment
and the returns to the LR accounts arrive. One question to examine is whether the time to
withdraw is crucial to the repayments the depositors might receive. If withdrawals are before the
loan repayments and the returns to LR accounts arrive, the nancial intermediaries are forced to
liquidate all assets, Bt = 1 and still fail to repay demand deposits, whether the SR or the LR
accounts. Consequently, the bank fails before the maturity date of accounts, and the depositors
may or may not receive repayments, depending on their rank in line to withdraw. This is the type
of bank run discussed in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
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If all withdrawals were after the arrival of returns for LR accounts, the nancial intermediaries
would have more funds to repay the depositors. Ideally, the nancial intermediaries could repay
fully the LR account holders and meet demand deposits for LR accounts, but not SR accounts,
according to equation (17). Although better o¤ by postponing their withdrawals until the LR
returns have arrived, the depositors risk receiving nothing if all others rush to withdraw before
the LR returns arrive. The best time to withdraw would be as soon as noticing the large shock,
regardless of whether the LR returns have arrived.
In the face of bank runs, the depositors who may or may not receive the repayments of their SR
accounts are the middle-aged investors or new entrepreneurs. Without repayments, the investors
cannot reinvest, and the entrepreneurs cannot operate rms for production. The bankruptcy
of banks prevents the young households and both domestic and foreign middle-aged investors at
period t from depositing their income and wealth, which are the sources of loanable funds for the
new entrepreneurs. Without the banks as the middlemen for both the debt and the equity markets,
private capital ows stop entering th edomestic country and sudden stops are not avoidable.
If early liquidation of LR accounts is su¢ cient to cover the shortfall in liquidity, 
1  Bt
  
1  St 1
  
1 + iELt 1

wt 1N > t, does this mean the bank runs have been prevented
successfully? Note that the early liquidated LR accounts would mature in the next period, and LR
accounts are also demand deposits. Therefore, it will require the nancial intermediaries to have
su¢ cient prot Bt+1 
 
1  Ht
  
1  St 1
  
1 + iLRDt 1

wt 1N to repay the LR demand deposit at
period t+1 to ensure that bank runs are actually prevented. If not, bank runs, followed by sudden
stops are only postponed one period to t+ 1.
3.2.3 Using SRL facilities and Banksmoral hazard problems
In general, SRL facilities are considered to be e¤ective in preventing bank runs and sudden stops.
This could be one of the reasons why several international organizations, such as IMF, have SRL
facilities available to its member countries. In this section, I would like to examine how e¤ective
the SRL facilities can be in preventing bank runs and sudden stops. Since it is the large shocks
that would cause unavoidable bank runs and sudden stops, the discussion will focus on them. In
response to large shocks, a su¢ cient amount of SRL (SRLt) > t is needed to prevent immediate
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bank runs and sudden stops. The question is for how long the SRL can prevent bank runs and
sudden stops.
Lenders often want to lend short-term, but borrowers often want to borrow long term. Whether
the adverse shock is temporary or permanent, SRL must be repaid. The name of SR implies that
the repayment can be made as soon as possible. Therefore, when to repay and the amount to repay
could be crucial for whether SRL take place and whether this might be another trigger for bank
runs and sudden stops.
Taking the temporarily adverse shock ("t) as an example, it will require the nancial interme-
diaries to accumulate su¢ cient prot within a limited amount of time to repay the SRL; otherwise,
the nancial intermediaries are subject to runs at the time of due payment to the lender, such as
IMF. To be more specic, if the due payment to the SRL lender were set at period t + 2, the
nancial intermediaries would experience liquidity problem at period t+ 2,
p
h
1 + iloant 1

bDt 1  Bt 1
i
<
" 
1 + iDt 1

St 1
(1  )N  Bt 1
#
+
 
1 + iSRLt
2
(SRLt);
where
 
1 + iSRLt
2
(SRLt) > "
 
1 + iloant 1

bDt 1  Bt 1

, and iSRLt represents the interest rate to be
paid for SRL. Thus, bank runs and sudden stops are postponed to the period t + 2 when the
repayment of SRL is due.
Knowing that banks will run at period t + 2, potential depositors would stop depositing into
domestic banks at period t + 1, St+1 = 0 and stop investing in equity markets via nancial in-
termediaries. Without deposits and funds for equity market, entrepreneurs cannot get funds to
start production at period t + 1, so they all behave as investors and invest in the foreign country,
bDt+1 = Bt+1 = 0, rather than operating rms. Moreover, both investors and entrepreneurs would
liquidate all their LR accounts, Ht+1 = 
B
t+1 = 1. This suggests that sudden stops might occur at
period t + 1, one period before the due payment to the SRL lender. The sudden stops at period
t+ 1 would decrease the banksprots at period t+ 2
 
Bt+2

, even though banksprot at period
t+ 1
 
Bt+1

can still be positive:
Bt+1 =
(
p
h
1 + iloant

bDt  Bt
i
 
" 
1 + iDt

St
(1  )N  Bt
#)
(18)
+
 
1  St 1
  
1  Bt
  
1 + iLRt 1
   1  Ht   1 + iLRDt 1 wt 1N	 ;
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where the rst curly bracket represents the prot earned from SR accounts, and the second curly
bracket is from LR accounts. As a result, banks would run at period t+2, ifBt+1 <
 
1 + iSRLt
2
(SRLt)
6.
Providing Bt+1 <
 
1 + iSRLt
2
(SRLt) and Bt+2 = 0, the net worth of the nancial intermediaries
would turn negative and the nancial intermediaries would be forced to run at period t+ 2. This
would encourage the banks to abscond with all the prot at hand while the prot is still positive.
This is banksmoral hazard problem. The maximum amount of prot to abscond with at period
t + 1
 
Bt+1
0
is the prot after receiving the loan repayments and the returns to the LR accounts
and without repaying the accounts:
 
Bt+1
0
=
h
p

1 + iloant 1

bDt 1 + (1  p)Bt 1
i
(1  )N+ 1  St 1  1  Bt   1 + iLRt 1wt 1N > Bt+1:
(18a)
The possibility that the banks have incentives to abscond at period t+1 could discourage potential
depositors from depositing in the domestic banks and cause sudden stops at period t, the period
when "t occurs and when the SRL is provided. Similarly, without deposits and investments in
equity markets via nancial intermediaries at period t, the banksprots at period t+1;
 
Bt+1

" =
0 <
 
1 + iSRLt
2
(SRLt). This would encourage banks to abscond with all prots at period tthat
is, after receiving loan repayments, the returns to the accounts, and SRL at period t. In other
words, absconding would occur at the period of the large shock, even though su¢ cient SRL was
provided to meet demand deposits in time. This might be the worst scenario for the institution(s)
which provide SRL facilities, and the citizens of the country su¤ering banking crises and sudden
stops.
To avoid a worst case scenario, it is crucial to give banks su¢ cient time to accumulate enough
prots to repay the lending:
jX
=1
(1 + i)j  Bt+ >
 
1 + iSRLt
j
t: (19)
6By updating equation (18) by one period and replacing the values of the variables at t+1 as indicated above, one
could obtain Bt+2 = 0. This gives 
B
t+1 + 
B
t+2 <
 
1 + iIMFt
2
t ; where 
B
t+2 = 0, so banks would run at period
t+ 2.
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Moreover, the incentive constraint to prevent banks to abscond is very important:
1X
=j+1
1
(1 + i)
Bt+ +
1
(1 + i)j
"
jX
=1
(1 + i)j  Bt+  
 
1 + iSRLt
j
(SRLt):
#
(20)
 1
(1 + i)t+
 
Bt+
0
+
 1X
=j+1
1
(1 + i)
Bt+ , where   j;
where j is the number of periods required for banks to accumulate su¢ cient prots to repay the
lending, and  is the period when the banks have strong incentives to abscond with all prots.
Equation (20) shows that the banks have no incentive to abscond when the present value of the
banksfuture prots by not absconding (left-hand-side) is no less than that of absconding at period
 (right-hand-side).
4 CONCLUSION & EXTENSIONS
The advantages of the overlapping generations framework allow this paper to investigate the links
between banking crises and sudden stops and discuss the e¤ectiveness of SRL provided by inter-
national organizations, such as International Monetary Fund (IMF). Consequently, I nd several
interesting results. First, an adverse shock may or may not trigger bank runs and sudden stops,
depending on the size of the shock and the e¤ects of the shocks on depositorsexpectation on the
likelihood bank runs. When depositorsfaith in banks is weak, even small shocks, which do not
a¤ect banksability to meet demand deposits fully, could cause panics and trigger bank runs and
sudden stops. This is where the availability of SRL facilities could be very helpful, as they serve
as insurance to prevent bank runs and sudden stops. Second, should there be a liquidity shortage,
although it might be the natural response to use new deposits to nance demand deposits, such
a response could jeopardize nancial intermediariespositions. That is, by o¤ering a competitive
deposit rate to attract new deposits, the nancial intermediaries would have to run at the follow-
ing period. However, if lowering the deposit rate, the nancial intermediaries may lose potential
depositors.
Third, a large shock, which a¤ects banksability to meet demand deposits, would require SRL
to prevent immediate bank runs and sudden stops. However, the due payment to the SRL provider
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could encourage banks to abscond and leave the demand deposits unpaid, another type of banks
moral hazard problem. This particular moral hazard problem is more likely to occur when the
nancial intermediaries do not have enough time to accumulate su¢ cient prots to repay. To
prevent this worst scenario for both the depositors and the institutions which provide the SRL
facilities, it is important to ensure a reasonable length of time for nancial intermediaries to repay
the due payment, and to satisfy the incentive constraint in ordre to prevent the moral hazard
problems.
There are several limitations of this paper, which can be extended in the future. The direct
extension is to allow for capital controls and to discuss the e¤ects of capital account liberalization
on bank runs and sudden stops. Other extensions include the direct access of individuals to the
credit markets, so that bank runs do not result in closing down all credit markets. Both extensions,
however, might raise the concern on the stability of the nancial system. To be more specic,
they raise the question of whether such openness or restrictions might increase the international
contagion e¤ects for the domestic nancial system.
:
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